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信危機(jī)及我國(guó)壽險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)逆向選擇問題的思考
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信危機(jī)及我國(guó)壽險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)逆向選擇問題的思考
摘 要：在信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)發(fā)展成為當(dāng)代主流經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)重要組成部分的背景下，針對(duì)我國(guó)壽險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)中大量存在的壽險(xiǎn)公司與投保方之間嚴(yán)重的信息不對(duì)稱問題，本文著重從微觀信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論層面對(duì)我國(guó)壽險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)的逆向選擇問題進(jìn)行研究。
本文論述了我國(guó)壽險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)上逆向選擇產(chǎn)生的原因及其造成的不良后果，充分證明了我國(guó)保險(xiǎn)業(yè)界解決信息不對(duì)稱問題和防范誠(chéng)信危機(jī)的重要性和緊迫性。通過構(gòu)造保險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)囚徒困境博弈模型，并對(duì)各種可能促使保險(xiǎn)雙方合作的機(jī)制進(jìn)行比較，本文得出激勵(lì)機(jī)制是緩解信息不對(duì)稱并有效解決我國(guó)保險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)囚徒困境的最優(yōu)戰(zhàn)略。本文對(duì)Rothschild-Stiglitz信息甄別模型進(jìn)行了評(píng)述和借鑒，它構(gòu)成本文針對(duì)我國(guó)壽險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)逆向選擇問題提出的各項(xiàng)對(duì)策建議的理論基礎(chǔ)。從對(duì)信息甄別模型的分析和結(jié)論中，本文得到啟示：當(dāng)壽險(xiǎn)公司無法有效區(qū)分不同風(fēng)險(xiǎn)類別的投保人時(shí)，它可以在保險(xiǎn)合同中設(shè)計(jì)1系列不同保障數(shù)額對(duì)應(yīng)不同保費(fèi)的保單組合供投保人自行選擇，然后通過觀察投保人的選擇來對(duì)他們的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)信息進(jìn)行甄別。最后，本文提出4種用以解決我國(guó)壽險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)逆向選擇問題的對(duì)策建議，包括: 設(shè)計(jì)相應(yīng)的保險(xiǎn)契約條款、加快建立保險(xiǎn)企業(yè)信用評(píng)級(jí)制度、保險(xiǎn)代理人激勵(lì)機(jī)制和建立完善保險(xiǎn)信息披露制度，并給出了具體的實(shí)施方案和修正意見。
關(guān)鍵詞: 信息不對(duì)稱；信息甄別；囚徒困境；保險(xiǎn)企業(yè)信用評(píng)級(jí)
Comments on the Good Faith Crisis and the Reflection of the Adverse Selection Problems in Domestic Insurance Market
Abstract：Facing the development of information economics as an important part of modern economics and serious asymmetric information between our insurer and insured, the paper studies solutions to these asymmetric information problems in our insurance market from information microeconomics. The paper discusses causes and disadvantageous results of the insureds adverse selection in our insurance market respectively. It proves that solving our asymmetric information problems is very important and urgent. Then the paper constructs a prisoners dilemma model in insurance market and compares several mechanisms likely propelling cooperation between both insurance sides, which draws a conclusion that the incentive mechanism is the best strategy to alleviate information asymmetry and solve the prisoners dilemma in our insurance market. The paper describes and comments on the Rothschild-Stiglitz screening model of the partial equilibrium. It constitutes the papers theoretic problems in our insurance market. Through these analysis and conclusions of the models, the paper receives the revelation: When the life insurance company is unable the policy holder which effectively differentiates the different risk category, it may design series of different safe guards amount correspondence different insurance premium in the insurance contract the chit combination voluntarily to choose for the policy holder, then through observes policy holders choice to carry on to their risk information screens. In the end, the paper puts forward four methods to resolve the adverse selection problems in our insurance market, which include designing the corresponding insurance contract provision, Speeding up the establishment insurance enterprise credit rating system, the safe agent drove the mechanism and establishing the consummates insurance information to disclose the system. In the end, it eventually has produced the concrete implementation plan and the revision opinion.
Keywords: Asymmetric Information; Partial Equilibrium; Prisoners Dilemma; Insurance Enterprise Credit Rating System
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